Johnson v. Reid
No. 04A-87, 2004 WL 1784349, at *1
(U.S. Aug. 11, 2004) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 6
Fall 9-1-2004
Johnson v. Reid No. 04A-87, 2004 WL 1784349, at
*1 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2004)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Johnson v. Reid No. 04A-87, 2004 WL 1784349, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2004), 17 Cap. DEF J. 99 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol17/iss1/6
Johnson v. Reid
No. 04A-87, 2004 WL 1784349, at *1
(U.S. Aug. 11, 2004)
L Facts
In December 1997 James Edward Reid pleaded guilty to capital murder
during the commission of attempted rape and attempted robbery, and the trial
court sentenced Reid to death.' After Reid's subsequent appeals and habeas
corpus petitions were denied, the Commonwealth of Virginia ("Common-
wealth") set Reid's execution for December 18, 2003.2 Three days before the
scheduled execution, Reid filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
three Virginia prison officials responsible for carrying out his execution, Gene M.
Johnson, George M. Hinkle, and William Page True ("Applicants").3 The 5 1983
action asserted that the Commonwealth's lethal injection protocol violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."4 Reid
1. Reid v. Commonwealth,506S.E.2d787,788 (Va. 1998);seeVA.CODEANN.5 18.2-31(4),
(5) (Michie 2004) (stating that "It]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of" a person while
committing attempted rape or attempted robbery shall constitute capital murder); see also VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-283 (Michie 2004) (providing that a court may convict a defendant of a felony upon
a plea of guilty). For a more complete description of Reid's case, see generally Maxwell C. Smith,
Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 465 (2004) (analyzing Reid v. True, 349 F.3d 788 (4th Cir. 2003)).
2. Reid v. Johnson, 105 Fed. Appx. 500, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2004) (opinion not selected for
publication).
3. Id at 502; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute.
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any ights...
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .. "). Gene Johnson is
the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, George Hinkle is the Warden of the
Greensville Correctional Center, and William Page True,Jr. is the Warden of Sussex I State Prison.
Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 500.
4. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 500-01; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). The
Commonwealth uses a mix of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride
when executing a person by lethal injection. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 502; see also Reid v. Johnson,
333 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546-48 (E.D. Va. 2004) (providing a complete description of the lethal
injection protocol for Reid's execution). Reid's primary claim was that the pancuronium bromide
neutralizes the effects of sodium thiopental, which renders a person unconscious shortly after the
injection. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 502. If a prisoner did not get the full effect of the sodium
thiopental, Reid alleged that he would feel the painful effects of the potassium chloride during the
execution. Id; see also Deborah W. Denno, When Legslatures Deegate Death: The Troubng Paradox
Behind State Uses of Electrocution andLethalInection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 100
(2002) (stating that pancuronium bromide causes condemned inmates to appear to be in a serene
state when they may actually be conscious and experiencing severe pain).
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sought to bar the Applicants from injecting him with the particular chemical
"cocktail" the Commonwealth uses in lethal injections.' The district court
dismissed the action and held that Reid should have brought his claim in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not under § 1983.6 The district court found
that Reid, having already sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, had to
obtain the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's permission in
order to file a second habeas corpus petition.
7
Reid then filed a notice of appeal from the district court's decision, and the
Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability ("COA'. 8 On December 17,
2003, the Fourth Circuit stayed the execution and held in abeyance whether
Reid's claim was cognizable under § 1983 until the United States Supreme Court
decided Nelson v. Campbell9 The issue in Nelson was whether § 1983 was an
appropriate means for an inmate on death row to seek an injunction barring a
state from performing an execution in an unconstitutional manner' On the day
set for Reid's execution, the Supreme Court denied the Applicants' motion to
vacate the Fourth Circuit's stay of Reid's execution."
On May 24, 2004, the Supreme Court held in Nelson that an inmate sen-
tenced to death may use a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to challenge a non-essential
part of a State's lethal injection procedure.'12 Three days later, the Applicants
petitioned the Fourth Circuit to vacate the stay of Reid's execution. 3 The
Applicants argued that the stay was moot because the execution date had
5. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 502.
6. Id;seeHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,481 (1994) (requiring a state prisoner challenging
the fact or duration of his confinement to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and not under 42 U.S.C.
1983).
7. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 501; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2000) (requiring a petitioner to
obtain permission from the court of appeals prior to filing a successive petition for a writ of habeas
corpus).
8. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 502; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000) (explaining when a petitioner
needs to obtain a COA from the court of appeals in order to appeal a decision in a habeas action);
see alIo 4TH CIR. R. 22(a) (providing procedures for seeking a COA from the Fourth Circuit).
Regarding the appeal, the Fourth Circuit was unsure whether Reid needed a COA before the court
considered his appeal. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 501 n. 1. The Fourth Circuit decided to assume that
Reid needed a COA and subsequently granted him one. Id
9. Brief for Respondent at 2,Johnson v. Reid, 2004 WL 1784349 (U.S. Aug. 11,2004) (No.
04A-87) (on file with author); see Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2123 (2004) (permitting a
death row inmate to use a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to challenge nonessential part of State's lethal
injection protocol). For a more complete discussion of Nelson, see generally Justin B. Shane, Case
Note, 17 CAP. DEF.J. 107 (2004) (analyzing Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S. Ct. 2117 (2004)).
10. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2120.
11. Johnson v. Reid, 124 S. Ct. 980, 980 (2003).
12. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2123-24.
13. Brief for Respondent at 3, Reid (No. 04A-87).
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passed.14 In July 2004 the Attorney General of Virginia demanded that the trial
court set a new execution date for Reid."5 Later that month, Reid sought a writ
of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Virginia to enjoin the trial court from
setting a new execution date and to enjoin the Commonwealth from seeking a
new execution date. 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia issued a writ of prohibition
preventing the trial court from setting a new execution date until the Fourth
Circuit decided whether to vacate the stay of execution. 7
On August 2, 2004, the Fourth Circuit made the decision it had been
holding in abeyance since December.' The court found, consistent with the
holding in Nelon, that Reid's § 1983 claim was proper and Reid was not required
to pursue habeas relief. 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision and remanded the case for the district court to determine the merits of
Reid's § 1983 claim and whether to grant another stay of execution.' The
Fourth Circuit denied the Applicants' motion to vacate the stay of execution and
ordered the stay to "remain in effect for ten days after the issuance of our
mandate or until Reid reinstates his request for preliminary injunctive relief in the
district court, whichever occurs first."2'
II. Holding
In a forty-two word order, the Supreme Court of the United States sum-
marily vacated the Fourth Circuit's stay of Reid's execution.2 The Court did not,
however, disturb the Fourth Circuit's decision to remand Reid's § 1983 claim to
the district court.' Thus, the ruling allowed the Commonwealth to schedule and
carry out Reid's execution before Reid exhausted his § 1983 claim.
14. Id.
15. Id at 4; see VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-232.1 (Michie 2002) (instructing the trial court to call
a hearing to set a date for execution once the Attorney General notifies the trial court that the
United States Court of Appeals has denied a inmate's federal habeas corpus petition).
16. Brief for Applicants at 4,Johnson v. Reid, 2004 WL 1784349 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2004) (No.
04A-87) (on file with author).
17. Id




22. Johnson v. Reid, No. 04-A87, 2004 WL 1784349, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2004).
23. Id.; see Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 503 (remanding Reid's § 1983 claim to the district court




The Supreme Court gave no reasons for vacating the stay of Reid's execu-
tion.'4 The Court's reasoning, however, can be inferred from the parties' filings,
the Court's decision in Nelson, and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Reid.5
A. Sovereign Power
The Applicants first argued that the Commonwealth had a strong interest
in exercising its sovereign power to carry out Reid's sentence.26 The Fourth
Circuit waited almost three months after the Court decided Nelson to decide
whether to vacate the stay.27 The Applicants argued that under Virginia Code 5
53.1-232(B), the Commonwealth must reschedule an execution date when a
scheduled execution passes because of a court-ordered stay.28 The Applicants
also cited Nelson, which noted that Alabama could reschedule Nelson's execution
during remand proceedings because the original stayed execution date had
expired.29 Thus, the Applicants argued that the stay had expired and the confu-
sion resulting from the Fourth Circuit's inaction prevented the Applicants from
carrying out Reid's sentence.'
In response, Reid cited two rules supporting his position that the stay
remained in effect. First, Reid cited Fourth Circuit Rule 8, which states that
"'[an order granting a stay or injunction pending appeal remains in effect until
issuance of the mandate or further order of the Court.' ..3 Second, Reid cited
Virginia Code section 53.1-232(D), which states that the Director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections must respect a stay of execution ordered by any court.
32
Further, Reid supported his argument by referring to the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision to uphold the stay by issuing a writ of prohibition.
33
24. Reid, 2004 WL 1784349, at *1.
25. See Brief for Applicants at 4-8, Reid (No. 04A-87) (arguing that the Court should vacate
the stay of Reid's execution); see also Brief for Respondent at 5-8, Reid (No. 04A-87) (arguing that
the Court should not vacate the stay of Reid's execution).
26. Brief for Applicants at 4-6, Reid (No. 04A-87).
27. Id at 3.
28. Id at 4; see VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-232(B) (Michie 2002) (stating that when the original
execution date passes, the trial court that set the first date shall schedule a new execution date).
29. Brief for Applicants at 5, Reid (No. 04A-87).
30. Id at 5-6. Applicants appeared to be making this argument because the Director of the
Department of Corrections was unable to reschedule the execution date because of the Supreme
Court of Virginia's order prohibiting the Director from performing such action. Id at 4.
31. Brief for Respondent at 6, Reid (No. 04A-87) (quoting 4TH CIR. R. 8); see 4TH CIR. R. 8
(explaining the status of a judgment when a petitioner files a notice of appeal with the Fourth
Circuit for review of that judgment).
32. Brief for Respondent at 6 n.3, Reid(No. 04A-87) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-232(D)).
33. Id at 6.
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B. Nelson Balancing Test
Second, the Applicants argued that Nelson does not require courts to keep
a stay of execution in effect while § 1983 claims are litigated. 34 The Court in
Nelson stated that "the mere fact that an inmate states a cognizable 5 1983 claim
does not warrant the entry of a stay as a matter of right. ' 3' Nelson instructed
courts to consider the possible success of the claim on the merits, the possible
harm to the parties, and the last-minute nature of the claim when assessing
whether to grant a stay of execution.36 The Applicants claimed that the Court
should vacate the stay because Reid had filed the action three days prior to the
execution, Reid's claim was not likely to succeed because the Commonwealth had
used the lethal injection protocol for years, and the Commonwealth had a strong
interest in carrying out the sentence.37 In particular, the Applicants emphasized
that Reid brought a claim three days prior to the execution that he could have
brought years earlier.38
In response, Reid argued that his claim challenged the Commonwealth's use
of cut-down procedures and, thus, in light of Nelson, the Court should uphold the
stay in order for the district court to rule on the constitutionality of the cut-down
procedure prior to Reid's execution.39 Reid attempted to distinguish his case
from others where the Supreme Court had vacated stays by arguing that his
execution was not imminent because the Commonwealth had not rescheduled
a new execution date.4' Reid implied that the Fourth Circuit's decision only kept
the stay in effect for another ten days and a Supreme Court order vacating the
stay was unnecessary because it would only allow the Director to schedule the
34. Brief for Applicants at 6-7, Reid (No. 04A-87).
35. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
36. Id; see alrso G mez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) ("A court may
consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant
equitable relief.").
37. Brief for Applicants at 7, Reid (No. 04A-87).
38. Id at 7. Specifically, the Applicants seemed to say that Virginia did not require them to
disclose the details of their lethal injection procedures until right before Reid's execution, but they
would have disclosed the procedures had the defense asked. See Response Brief for Applicants at
2 n.2,Johnson v. Reid, 2004 WL 1784349 (No. 04A-87) (replying to Reid's claim that the proce-
dures were not available to the defense prior to filing the § 1983 claim). According to Deborah W.
Denno, the Commonwealth was one of four states that would not disclose the chemicals used in
their lethal injection protocol as of 2001. DENNO, supra note 4, at 116, 146.
39. Brief for Respondent at 7, Reid (No. 04A-87). Although Reid's original § 1983 claim did
not challenge the Commonwealth's use of a cut-down procedure for gaining venous access, Reid
claimed that the Commonwealth did not disclose its intention to use the procedure until after the
claim was filed. Id Reid planned to amend his complaint to include a challenge to the use of the
cut-down procedure. Id.
40. Id at 7.
2004]
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execution a few days earlier."' Further, Reid argued that he could not have
brought his claim any earlier because the Commonwealth did not disclose its
lethal injection procedures before Reid filed his claim.
42
IV. Application in Virginia
The Supreme Court's summary decision in Reidseems to have hinged on the
untimeliness of Reid's filing. The Supreme Court in Nelson and the Fourth
Circuit in Reid recognized that a petitioner may challenge execution procedures
by using a § 1983 claim as opposed to a habeas corpus petition.43 However,
when a defendant makes a challenge under § 1983, the court has discretion not
to enter a stay of execution.' When a defendant makes such a claim, the court
must review the likelihood that the claim will succeed, the relative harm to the
parties, and the timeliness of the inmate's claim.4" After setting out that test three
months earlier in Nelson, it is safe to assume that the Court analyzed the Appli-
cants' motion to vacate the stay under the same rubric.
The most significant feature of Reid's claim was its last-minute nature. Reid
filed his claim three days prior to the execution.' Regardless of the reasons for
lateness, the Court clearly disfavors claims filed that close to the execution.47 As
41. See id. at 5 ("[T]he Fourth Circuit already has provided for the timely termination of its
preliminary injunction and for the district court's timely consideration of Reid's to-be-filed
application for a preliminary injunction.").
42. Id. at 8. In addition to the Commonwealth's failure to make the information available,
the defense emphasized that Virginia allows the Applicants to change abruptly the lethal injection
protocol. Id at 8 n.4. Thus, Reid could not challenge the lethal injection protocol itself because,
even if it had been disclosed, there was no way of knowing what protocol the Applicants would
actually use until the last minute. Id Reid made the additional argument that this was not a" 'most
extraordinary circumstancefl' " that warrants the Court's action. Id at 5-6 (quoting SUP. CT. R.
23.3). The rule states, "[e]xcept in the most extraordinary circumstances, an application for a stay
will not be entertained unless the relief requested was first sought in the appropriate court or courts
below or from a judge or judges thereof." SuP. CT. R. 23.3. This argument may not have worked
because the Applicants had previously filed a motion to vacate with the Fourth Circuit. Brief for
Applicants at 3, Reid (No. 04A-87). Thus, the Applicants did seek the relief requested from the
appropriate court below, and the Court was not restricted to entertaining the application only if it
was an extraordinary circumstance. Id
43. See Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2123 (stating that "[a] suit seeking to enjoin a particular means
of effectuating a sentence of death does not directly call into question the 'fact' or 'validity' of the
sentence itself' is a challenge to the conditions of the sentence and cognizable under § 1983); Reid,
105 Fed. Appx. at 503 (explaining that Reid's claim was cognizable under § 1983 because it
challenged the procedure involved in the execution and not the execution itself).
44. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
45. Id at 2126.
46. Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 502.
47. See Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2126 ("'Ihere is a strong equitable presumption against the grant
of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the
merits without requiring entry of a stay.").
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Reiddemonstrates, the Court will not require federal courts hearing such a 5 1983
claim to stay the execution while the claim is being decided. Thus, when chal-
lenging a lethal injection protocol, inmates need to file 5 1983 claims as early as
possible in order to give federal courts time to rule on the merits prior to any
scheduled execution date.
Since Nelson, other federal courts have denied requests to stay executions
based on the factors set forth in Nelson.48 In Harris v. Johnson,49 the prisoner
brought a claim under 5 1983 to enjoin the State of Texas from using a particular
chemical mix in its lethal injection protocol.' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the State's motion to vacate the temporary
restraining order because Harris had waited until ten weeks prior to the sched-
uled execution to bring the claim.5 The primary differences between Harris's
and Reid's claims are that Harris had been on death row for 18 years without
bringing the claim and Texas's lethal injection protocol had been public informa-
tion.5 2 In denying the claim, the Fifth Circuit hinted that death row inmates
should bring their 5 1983 claims during federal habeas proceedings in order to
give federal courts adequate time to decide the claim.53
Nelson and Reid also teach inmates to carefully focus their claims.54 An
action challenging the cut-down procedure used in a lethal injection is cognizable
under 5 1983 as long as the cut-down procedure is unnecessary for carrying out
the lethal injection.55 However, the Court in Nelson notes that challenges to an
execution procedure may not be cognizable under 5 1983 if a statute mandates
that procedure or the procedure is necessary for the execution.56 In finding
Reid's claim judicially cognizable under § 1983, the Fourth Circuit pointed to
Reid's assertion that other constitutionally permissible lethal injection protocols
exist.5 7 Inmates may benefit by pointing to other acceptable execution proce-
dures when asserting a § 1983 claim in order to demonstrate that they are not
challenging the method of execution generally.
48. See Harris v.Johnson, 376 F.3d 414, 417-19 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying Harris's request for
an injunction against the State from using a particular execution method because of the last-minute
nature of Harris's claim).
49. 376 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004).
50. Harris, 376 F.3d at 415-16.
51. Id. at 416.
52. Id. at 417.
53. Id.
54. See Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2122 (finding that Nelson avoided having to file his claim as a
writ of habeas corpus by carefully wording his complaint).
55. Id
56. Id




In asserting a § 1983 claim, inmates must focus their claims in a way that
does not challenge the sentence as such."8 An inmate's claim may only challenge
the conditions of the sentence.59 Further, such challenges should be brought as
early as possible because federal courts are under no obligation to issue stays of
executions while inmates litigate their 5 1983 claims.6" Particularly, inmates will
have no excuse for waiting to assert claims on the eve of their executions because
the Commonwealth's lethal injection protocol is now public knowledge.
V. Epilogue
On September 3, the district court denied Reid's motion for injunctive relief
in the form of a stay of the execution that the Commonwealth had set for
September 9,2004.61 The district judge found that Reid did not establish that the
chemical combination in the Commonwealth's protocol would cause Reid to
experience immediate irreparable harm because "the chance that Reid will be
conscious of any pain associated with the second two drugs and of his death is
less than 6/1000 of one percent."'62 The United States Supreme Court rejected
Reid's last-minute request for an injunction, and Governor Mark Warner denied
Reid's clemency petition on the day the execution.63  The Commonwealth
executed James Edward Reid on September 9, 2004.' Due to his compromised
veins, the executioner needed to insert the intravenous line in Reid's upper
groin.65 Reid's last words were, "I forgive you for what you are doing but I don't
forgive you for what you think, or for what you feel, or what you say, or what
you do. I forgive you because God has forgiven me. ,66
Justin B. Shane
58. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2122.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2125-26.
61. Reid, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
62. Id. at 551.
63. Frank Green, Requests Denied; Killer is Executed; James Edward Reid Killed Cbristiansbur
Woman in October '96, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL 61914911.
64. Ian Shapira, Virginia Executes Elder# lomans Killer, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at B3,
available at 2004 WL 93175121.
65. Green, supra note 63, at BI.
66. Id
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